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At this moment the King, who had been for some time busily writing
in his note-book, called out "Silence!", and read out from his book,
"Rule Forty-two. All persons more than a mile high to leave the
court."
Everybody looked at Alice.
"I'm not a mile high," said Alice.
"You are," said the King.
"Nearly two miles high," added the Queen.
"Well, I sha'n't go, at any rate," said Alice; "besides, that's not a
regular rule: you invented it just now."
"It's the oldest rule in the book," said the King.
"Then it ought to be Number One," said Alice.
The King turned pale, and shut his notebook hastily.
-Lewis Carroll from Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, 19011
ALICE was wise beyond her years. In this obstinate child's bom-
/ bast, we find an implicit understanding of a jurisprudential prin-
L ciple that has confounded legal academics, judges, and
practitioners for ages-that of the "Rule of Law." To her, an arbitrary
judicial pronouncement did not require obedience; a rule was not really a
rule if "invented."
The idea that laws, not individuals, govern our society is at the core of
most citizens' understandings of the American judicial system. We elect
legislatures to enact laws, rather than depend solely on judge-made com-
mon law. Furthermore, we like to believe that courts impartially apply
these knowable and known legislative directives in the controversies that
come before them. Idealized judicial decision making, like the goddess
Justice, is blind.
In practice, however, courts appear to deviate from this ideal. The law
does not seem to provide determinate rules for reaching systematically
neutral outcomes. Judges manipulate facts, distinguish precedent, and ig-
nore or "discover" legislative intent to reach desired ends. In many cases,
the judicial system appears to be nothing more than a conduit through
which judges further their personal conceptions of "justice."'2
This apparent lack of determinacy in the law has led some scholars to
conclude that the rule of law may have never truly existed anywhere. 3
Ambiguity in the law, they argue, provides judges with unfettered discre-
tion in deciding the cases that come before them. If judges are bound
only by the limits of their conscience, they become the ultimate reposito-
ries of legal rights, and the rule of law becomes a naive fantasy.
1. Reprinted in MARTIN GARDNER, MORE ANNOTATED ALICE 145-46 (1990).
2. Some judges have even been so bold as to admit this-after leaving the bench, of
course. See, e.g., HON. ROBERT SATTER, DOING JUSTICE: A TRIAL JUDGE AT WORK 63-79
(1990).
3. See, e.g., Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory,
94 YALE L.J. 1, 14 (1984).
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Despite their tremendous breadth, these arguments are exceedingly
shallow. They assume a unidimensional system of justice wherein "the
law" provides the. only tool for judicial decision making. The Anglo-
American legal tradition is binary-divided into the distinct realms of
"law" and "equity." Although we have largely abandoned the physical
separation of the courts and the chancery, vestiges of the ideological sep-
aration remain. Perhaps it is the presence of this second factor, rather
than a general failure of the rule of law, that best explains the lack of
rigid rule application in judicial decision making.
What exactly is the "Rule of Law?" Does it exist in our system now?
Has it ever truly existed in the Anglo-American courts? If not, what are
the ramifications to our legal institutions?
This essay reexamines the jurisprudence of judicial discretion adding
the view of the law's often neglected sibling, equity. First, I explore the
historical development of law and equity in the Anglo-American judicial
system, tracking law and equity from the fourteenth century decrees of
the King's secretary to the twentieth century merger in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Next, I utilize the ideological distinctions of our his-
torically binary judicial system to examine the rule of law and critique
three of the major modern theories of judicial decision making-Realism
(including CLS), Neo-Positivism, and Dworkinianism. Finally, applying
the foregoing critiques and historical understanding, I suggest the return
to a more honest (and perhaps better) framework for judicial decision
making based on the ideological separation of the realms of law and
equity.
II. ON LEGAL RULES AND EQUITABLE STANDARDS
A. A TALE OF Two SYsTEMs
1. The Rule of Law
The science of the law is our great security against the maladminis-
tration of justice. If the decision of litigated questions were to de-
pend upon the will of the Judge or upon his notions of what was just,
our property and our lives would be at the mercy of a fluctuating
judgement [sic], or of caprice. The existence of a system of rules and
conformity to them are the essential conditions of all free govern-
ment, and of republican government above all others. The law is our
only sovereign. We have enthroned it.
-David D. Field at the opening of the
Law School of the University of Chicago, September 21, 1859.4
Like most American laymen, I grew up with an implicit understanding
of the basic principles underlying the rule of law. Impartiality was an
essential element of fairness; fairness was an essential element of the law.
4. 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY
FIELD 517, 530 (Sprague ed. 1884), reprinted in Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 909, 935 (1987).
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From mandatory nap time to minimum age requirements, I was socialized
to accept properly promulgated rules because they were rules, regardless
of whether they fit particular instances.
This layman's understanding of the rule of law has been repeatedly
challenged during the course of my legal education 5 and is surely too sim-
plistic for use in a scholarly paper. A more exacting definition is in order.
To this end, I will adopt the defining characteristics set forth in a recent
article by Professor Cass Sunstein:
A system committed to the rule of law seems to require (1) clear,
general, publicly accessible rules laid down in advance; (2) prospec-
tivity and a ban on retroactivity; (3) a measure of conformity be-
tween law in the books and law in the world; (4) hearing rights and
availability of review by independent adjudicative officials; (5) sepa-
ration between law-making and law-implementation; (6) no rapid
changes in the content of law; and (7) no contradictions or inconsis-
tency in the law.6
A commitment to the rule of law, then, requires knowable and known
law, applied prospectively and consistently, and promulgated and re-
viewed by individuals other than those charged with applying it.
The history of the courts of common law is a history of movement to-
ward this end. The writ, trial by jury, and single-issue pleading, each of
which evolved in the English courts during the thirteenth through six-
teenth centuries, were attempts to move toward a confined, rational, and
regular system of rules for governing human conduct. 7 Professor Subrin
characterized this movement as an attempt to ensure determinacy in the
law: "[i]n short, a goal of the common law was predictability by identify-
ing fact patterns that would have clearly articulated consequences."8
Following the American Revolution, the former British colonies briefly
flirted with the idea of a civil law system modeled on that of France.9 But
ultimately, the respective states and the federal government adopted the
English system almost intact. 10 The British system of writs, single-issue
pleading, and jury trials persisted in the American courts of law, though
less formal and less developed than their Anglican counterparts. 1 Simi-
lar to their English forebearers, the states and the new Republic struc-
tured the law courts to maximize determinacy and reduce the incidence
of unwarranted judicial discretion. 12
5. See, e.g., George A. Martinez, Civil Procedure Lecture at SMU School of Law
(Oct. 5, 1994) (concerning the propriety of jury nullification of the law) (notes on file with
the author).
6. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 968 (1995) (footnotes
omitted).
7. Subrin, supra note 4, at 914-17.
8. Id. at 921.
9. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 94-95 (1973).
10. See id. at 95-96.
11. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 927-28.
12. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1183 (1991) ("The dominant strategy to keep agents of the central government under con-
trol was to use the populist and local institution of the jury.").
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The nineteenth century saw the American courts of law come into their
own. Judges shouldered the sole responsibility for interpreting and ap-
plying the law,13 relegating the jury to its modern role of mere fact finder
in an attempt to promote more uniform adjudication.' 4 As the century
drew to a close, tightly constrained statutory law making grew increas-
ingly popular, while judicial rule making fell into increasing disfavor.
This trend culminated early in the next century in Justice Holmes's fa-
mous dissent to Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,15 and in the Court's subse-
quent repudiation of federal common law in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 16
The result of this evolution of Anglo-American law was a slow, steady
movement toward determinacy. It was a movement toward indepen-
dently promulgated, consistently applied, knowable and known law. It
was a movement toward the rule of law as rule number one.
But beginning in the mid-1800s, changes to the basic structure of the
American judicial system would create a cancer in the corpus of legal
determinacy; a cancer that would ultimately result in the practical death
of the rule of law. But before hazarding an explanation of the foregoing
statement, a brief history of the workings of the law's companion system,
equity, is required.
2. Remedy in Context: The Roots of Equity
[L]aw is always a general statement, yet there are cases which it is
not possible to cover in a general statement.
-Aristotle from Nichomachean Ethics17
Where there is injustice, we should correct it.
-Former Chief Justice Earl Warren, 197218
Equity is the exercise of the sovereign's prerogative to mitigate the se-
verity of the sovereign's laws. It is an exercise in sovereign grace necessi-
tated by the inherently overinclusive nature of legal rules. In short,
equity exists to grant relief in the specific cases where blind application of
the law would work an injustice.19
Equity, in the Anglo-American legal tradition, traces its roots to the
King's secretary, the Chancellor. Chancellors, originally priests and later
trained lawyers, served as the King's administrators. In the course of
13. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 929.
14. See Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J.
170, 170-71 (1964) (traditional function of interpreting law minimized in favor of fact
finding).
15. 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The common law is not a
brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-
sovereign that can be identified ... .
16. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
17. Quoted in PETER C. HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE 8 (1990).
18. EARL WARREN, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 6 (1972), quoted in HOFFER,
supra note 17, at 5.
19. This is equity in the broad sense. Scholars have recognized the existence of two
"equities:" (1) the broad concept delineated above; and (2) the narrow conception of max-
ims and procedures seen in practice. See, e.g., HOFFER, supra note 17, at 21. I do not rely
heavily on this distinction.
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their administrative duties, the Chancellors would hear pleas from the
King's subjects requesting the King's assistance in settling disputes.
In most cases, the Chancellor would issue an order authorizing the
complaining party to seek redress in the law courts of the King's Bench. 20
But in exceptional cases, for example, those requesting relief from the
overharsh application of law or those where legal remedies were insuffi-
cient or non-existent, the Chancellor could take in personam jurisdic-
tion.21 Through the exercise of this power, the Chancellor could compel
the parties to behave in accordance with the dictates of conscience.2 2 At
first, the parties' consciences were determinative. 23 But as the Chancel-
lors became more comfortable in their role, they began relying more on
their own consciences and less on that of the parties to the disputes.2 4
This new self-reliance raised concerns for the proper exercise and
scope of the Chancellor's discretion.2 5 As Professor Hoffer points out,
without some form of constraint, the chancery's adjudicative freedom
could easily slide into judicial oppression: "There is a fine line between
the chancellor who exercises the full scope of his powers to do justice and
one who combines ideological perversity with tyrannical license. '2 6
To safeguard against such perversion, the chancery drew on the princi-
ples underlying one of its own devices-the trust. This metaphor viewed
the sovereign as the trust "settlor," depositing the "corpus" of its power
with the Chancellor/trustee to be exercised for the benefit of the citi-
zenry.2 7 In this way, the Chancellor's power was limited. He could no
more properly act in contravention of the sovereign's will or act to the
detriment of the public than could any similarly situated fiduciary.
Over the years, equity grew interstitially, filling the gaps left by the
common law.28 By the sixteenth century, the English courts of chancery
were well established-their procedures had become formalized and their
jurisdiction clear. A binary judicial system had emerged. This system of
20. In time, these routine orders became the formalized writs of English common law.
Subrin, supra note 4, at 915.
21. In the words of Professor Subrin: "[t]he main staples of Chancery jurisdiction be-
came the broader and deeper reality behind appearances, and the subtleties forbidden by
the formalized writ, such as fraud, mistake, and fiduciary relationships." Id. at 918 (foot-
note omitted).
22. HOFFER, supra note 17, at 26.
23. Subrin, supra note 4, at 918. Consider for example the maxim, "He who would
have equity must perform equity."
24. HOFFER, supra note 17, at 26; see also Subrin, supra note 4, at 919.
25. As one 17th century common lawyer pointed out:
Equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as it is
larger or narrower so is equity. Tis all one as if they should make the Stan-
dard for the measure wee call A foot, to be the Chancellors foot; what an
uncertain measure would this be; one Chancellor has a long foot another A
short foot a third an indifferent foot; tis the same thing in the Chancellors
Conscience.
JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43 (Frederick Pollock, ed. 1927), quoted in
HOFFER, supra note 17, at 17.
26. HOFFER, supra note 17, at 20.
27. Id. at 33.
28. Subrin, supra note 4, at 920.
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law courts and chancery strove to provide adjudication that was both de-
terminate and flexible, neutral, and just.
Similar to their courts of law, equity in the American colonies roughly
copied that of Great Britain. At first, the physical dispersion of the popu-
lace and lack of a solid judicial and social infrastructure prevented the
duplication of the binary English system. Local courts, lacking man-
power and expertise, tended to mix legal and equitable proceedings.2 9
But as the colonies became more settled, true courts of chancery ap-
peared. 30 By the turn of the nineteenth century, equity was firmly estab-
lished in the new Republic. 31
The evolution of equity, here and abroad, was the evolution of moralis-
tic discretion. The antithesis of law, equity developed as a necessary com-
pliment to its sibling system. The Chancellor was "the law's conscience,"
constrained by the will of the sovereign and the needs of the people, but
free to act when required to prevent injustice.
B. MERGER: DAZED AND CONFUSED
The day will come when lawyers will cease to inquire whether a
given rule be a rule of equity or a rule of the common law: suffice it
that it is a well-established rule administered by the High Court of
Justice.
-Frederick W. Maitland's prediction of the effect of
Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1873.32
As noted earlier, the lack of manpower and physical dispersion of the
populace hampered the early establishment of equity in the American
colonies. It was a matter of simple economics-communities could not
support the two separate courts. The result was a merger of necessity,
wherein the duty of enforcing both legal and equitable rights fell on uni-
tary courts.33 Perhaps this early experience with a unified system indeli-
bly marked the American settlers, providing fertile ground for the seeds
of true merger, sown without success for years in Great Britain,34 to take
29. HOFFER, supra note 17, at 52.
30. New York established a central court of equity in 1701, New Jersey in 1702. Id. at
51. In many outlying areas, however, the mongrelization of law and equity persisted. It
was this mongrelization that would seed the cancer of indeterminacy alluded to above.
Supra Part II.A.1.
31. As evidence of equity's establishment, see the U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The
framers felt it necessary to expressly extend the judicial power of the United States "to all
Cases, in Law and Equity." THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 479-80 (Alexander Hamilton)
(William R. Brock ed., 1992); see also A. J. PEELER, LAW AND EoUI' 3-5 (1883). For a
detailed discussion of the inclusion and significance of this phrase in the Constitution, see
id. at 1-37. But see PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 750 (3d ed. 1988) ("in 1789 equity was either non-
existent or undeveloped in the courts of many of the states") [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER].
32. Quoted in Ralph E. Kharas, A Century of Law-Equity Merger in New York, 1
SYRACUSE L. REV. 186 (1950).
33. See HOFFER, supra note 17, at 48.
34. English commentators had unsuccessfully pushed for the merger of the law courts
and the chancery since at least the 1650s. Id. at 36.
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root in the United States.
1. Early Attempts at Merger
a. The Field Code
By the mid-nineteenth century, most states had established true courts
of equity. But a movement was afoot to merge these chancery courts
with the courts of law. This movement "grounded first in liberalism and
then in laissez faire economics and Social Darwinism ' '35 culminated in
1846 with the ratification of a new state constitution in New York.
This new constitution made no provision for courts of chancery. There-
fore, to maintain equity within its system, New York enacted a new Code
of Civil Procedure two years later.36 Commonly known as the Field
Code, after its principal draftsman David Dudley Field, the Code of 1848
merged legal and equitable procedure in the New York courts of law. 37
Despite counsel from many legal notables against merger,38 the Field
Code was adopted in some form by about half the states, covering the
majority of the country's population. 39
The ultimate effect of this merger was then and remains now, unclear.
Some judges viewed the Field Code as freeing them to apply any and all
jurisprudential tools available. For them, a substantive union of law and
equity naturally flowed from a physical and procedural one.40 Other
judges, however, held steadfastly to ideological distinctions despite the
physical and procedural merger of the systems.41 In the legal academy at
least, it appears that the former judges won out.42 What is clear after the
Field Code was that law and equity were one for much of the American
population.
35. Subrin, supra note 4, at 1000.
36. Kharas, supra note 32, at 186.
37. Id.
38. Joseph Story, for one, was concerned that merger would endanger the confining
quality of law and the creative force of equity. See GARY L. McDOWELL, EQUITY AND
THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT, EQUITABLE RELIEF, AND PUBLIC POLICY 76-
81(1982).
39. Subrin, supra note 4, at 939.
40. For example, consider Judge Cardozo's statement that: "The whole body of princi-
ples, whether of law or of equity, bearing on the case, becomes the reservoir to be drawn
upon by the court in enlightening its judgment." Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. A.O. Anderson
Co., 146 N.E. 381, 384 (N.Y. 1925) (citation omitted).
41. See, e.g., Jackson v. Strong, 118 N.E. 512 (N.Y. 1917) ("where some ground of
equitable jurisdiction is alleged in the complaint but fails .... the court will not retain the
action and grant purely legal relief.) and progeny discussed in Kharas, supra note 32
at 194-195.
42. See, e.g., Kharas, supra note 32, at 186 (noting the trend among law schools to
abolish separate courses in equity in favor of sprinkling equity within courses on substan-
tive law); see also, SCHEDULE OF CLASSES: SCHOOL OF LAW OF SOUTHERN METHODIST
UNIVERSITY, Fall 1996 (failing to list a separate course on equity) (on file with the author).
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b. The British Merger
In the late nineteenth century, concerns for abuse of discretion within
the Chancery led to a similar transformation of law and equity in Great
Britain.43 During the later part of the eighteenth and early part of the
nineteenth centuries, the British began to introduce equitable procedures
and doctrines into the common law courts. 44 The Supreme Court of Judi-
cature Act of 1873 finalized the British merger process.45
The British movement relied heavily on the Field Code,46 but unlike
the Field code, the British merger was clearly intended to be substantive
as well as physical and procedural. 47 The resulting system, based primar-
ily on equity, was simpler and less constraining.48 Early in the next cen-
tury, American commentators would point to this British system as a
model for procedural reform in the United States.49
2. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
In the early years of the twentieth century, the United States federal
courts continued to adhere to the traditional procedural distinction be-
tween law and equity.50 They formed the only major judicial system to
do so.5 1 This would soon change.
Shortly after the turn of the century, the American Bar Association,
led by Roscoe Pound, began a push for procedural reform in the courts of
the United States. Pound argued that the then existing procedural rules
hampered the judges' ability to "search independently for truth and jus-
tice."'52 This, coupled with concerns for public confusion caused by over-
technical rules, led to the passage of the Enabling Act in 1934. Four years
later, the United States Supreme Court would promulgate the modern
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 3
The result was an open and flexible system. As Professor Subrin notes,
the "procedure was to step aside and let the substance through. In short,
judges were to have discretion to do what was right."'5 4 The intent was to
create an entirely new jurisprudential animal, based largely on equity,
43. See HOFFER, supra note 17, at 28.
44. Subrin, supra note 4, at 957.
45. Kharas, supra note 32, at 186.
46. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 942-43.
47. See, e.g., Frederick W. Maitland, quoted above and in Kharas, supra note 32, at
186.
48. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 943.
49. See id.
50. The Constitution and Congress had bestowed joint legal and equitable jurisdiction
on the federal courts from inception, but the courts maintained a strict dichotomy in plead-
ing, proof, and remedies. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 31, at 750-51.
51. A few states, including Rhode Island, maintained separate courts of chancery, but
they were by far the minority.
52. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 405 (1906), quoted in Subrin, supra note 4, at 945.
53. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 31, at 759-61.
54. Subrin, supra note 4, at 944.
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purposely lacking any means of restraint. 55 They succeeded. And with
their success, the rule of law died.
III. TOWARD A MORE FORTHCOMING SYSTEM
A. CONUNDRUMS AND EMANATIONS: LAW, EQUITY, AND THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
By what process can these two modes of relief be made identical? It
is possible to abolish one or the other, or both, but it certainly is not
possible to abolish the distinction between them.
-Reubens v. Joel56
The mergers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries succeeded
in their attempts to abolish the facial distinctions between law and equity.
The courts unified, the procedures wed, and the substance of equity scat-
tered among the law.
But scratching the surface reveals a different story. Equity did not
merge with the law so much as it subsumed it.57 Because the modes of
relief could not be made identical, law qua law was abolished.
Take, for example, the classic case of Riggs v. Palmer,58 decided in the
Court of Appeals of New York forty-one years after the adoption of the
Field Code. In Riggs, the beneficiary under a will murdered the testator
in an attempt to accelerate enjoyment of the gift. The New York high
court held that the otherwise proper gift was null and void to the murder-
ing beneficiary.5 9 An "equitable construction," reasoned the court,
brought this case out from under the Statute of Wills. 60 The "fundamen-
tal maxim[ ] of the common law" that "[n]o one shall be permitted ... to
take advantage of his own wrong" justified denying the gift as a matter of
law.61
"Equitable construction?" "Maxim of the common law?" As the dis-
sent to Riggs points out, and as I agree, the majority was terribly con-
fused.62 Couching an argument in legal terms does not make its
resolution a matter of law. This was not a decision based on law at all,
but a clear and obvious exercise of equitable discretion.
The kind of muddled reasoning and mongrelized logic exhibited by the
Riggs majority is archetypical of court opinions following merger. Be it
because of confusion or of calculation, constructing this kind of legal
facade for an exercise of equitable discretion and calling it "law" appears
55. See id. at 975.
56. 13 N.Y. 488, 493 (1856) (Selden, J.).
57. As Professor Subrin points out, by moving to an equity-based procedure "the tail
of historic adjudication [is] now wagging the dog," Subrin, supra note 4, at 922.
58. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
59. Id. at 191.
60. See id. at 189.
61. Id. at 190.
62. See id. at 193.
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to be the judicial norm.63 The current jurisprudence of judicial decision
making is the child of this systemic confusion. As detailed below, 64 each
of the major modern theories of judicial decision making blurs the ideo-
logical distinction underlying law and equity. The result of this blurring is
an unchecked discretion and an end to the rule of law as traditionally
conceived.
1. A Quadrantial Approach
The modern jurisprudential theories of judicial decision making may be
broken down into four basic elements: positivism, moralism, formalism,
and realism. Positivism and moralism are diametrically opposed. Like-
wise, formalism and realism are polar opposites.
To the positivist, the "law" is what the law says and nothing more. It is
the black letter command of the sovereign; it is "rules." To the moralist,
the "law" is what is right. It is inexorably intertwined with morality; it is
"justice." For the formalist, the application of law is mechanical. Plug in
the facts to the given law and the outcome is automatic. For the realist,
the application of law is dynamic. Outcomes are indeterminate given the
law and the facts because decision making is open to discretion.
Much of the early literature views positivism and formalism as neces-
sarily coupled ideas, but recent articles have challenged the mandatory
nature of this pairing.65 Similarly, positivism was thought for years to be
ideologically inconsistent with realism, but modern scholarship has also
challenged this idea.66 The reasoning underlying these traditional pair-
ings should become apparent momentarily,67 but the modern ideological
distinction between each element is clear.
Laying out these basic building blocks into quadrants, four possible ju-
risprudential theories of judicial decision making become apparent:
63. See, e.g., SATrER, supra note 2, at 72-75 (providing an example of molding legal
rules to fit a choice based on the judge's personal values).
64. Infra part III.A.2.b-d.
65. See, e.g., Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2054,
2057 (1995) (noting that positivism does not, of necessity, equal formalism).
66. See LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 46-47 (1940).










Note that "naturalism" or "natural law" theory, is not included among
the basic elements on the chart. This is not to discount the view of natu-
ral law theorists, but rather because natural law by its own definition is
beyond the scope of this essay. Natural law is defined as encompassing
the entirety of human law.68 Therefore, natural law, if accepted, would
provide the backdrop upon which the four quadrants lie.
2. The Application of Quadrant Theory to the Existing Jurisprudence
The norms and attitudes borrowed from equity define our current
legal landscape ....
-Professor Stephen N. Subrin 69
a. Traditional Law and Equity
Traditional conceptions of law and equity occupy quadrants three and
two respectively. As detailed above,70 traditionalists viewed law as the
command of the sovereign. Whether expressed through the judicial com-
mon law or through legislative statutory enactment, the law was a set of
positive rules for ordering human conduct. Application of these rules
was to be straight forward and mechanical. Legal structures and rules of
interpretation evolved to constrain decision making.
Equity was the realm of the conscience, the realm of the exception to
the general rule, the realm of morality.71 Traditionalists understood that
the application of equity would vary, hence the concern for the size of the
Chancellor's "foot." Equity was necessarily dynamic and constrained
only by the bounds of the -public trust.
68. See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA in 2 BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT
THOMAS AQUINAS 784-85 (Anton C. Pegis ed. 1945) (answering the question "Whether
every human law is derived from the natural law?" in the affirmative).
69. Subrin, supra note 4, at 925.
70. See supra Section I1.A.1.
71. See supra Section II.A.2.
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This is the perspective of most pre-merger theorists. 72 John Austin's
"command theory," for example, is based on an implicit understanding of
the different realms of "positive law" and "positive morality. '73 Simi-
larly, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in his famous article "The Path of Law"
exhibits a learned grasp of the legal/equitable dichotomy.74
But most post-merger theory fails to separate these concepts. 75 The
merger of law and equity has blurred the distinction between equity in
the system (provisions authorizing equitable relief) and equity of the sys-
tem (the diffuse concept of fairness).76 Each of the major modern theo-
ries of judicial decision making crept out of the resulting jurisprudential
fog.
b. Traditional Realism and CLS
To proponents of traditional realism and Critical Legal Studies, the
"law" is what the law says. Judicial pronouncements and legislative direc-
tives provide the building blocks for judicial decision making. But what
the law "says" is unclear. Ambiguities, contradictions, and exceptions in
the positive law leave room for (and indeed invite) selective interpreta-
tion.77 For these scholars, the ultimate application of law is dynamic and
indeterminate. 78 A positivist view of the law coupled with discretionary
72. This is also the perspective of most modern Americans. See RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY Vii (1977) (describing Benthamite legal positivism and utilita-
rianism as the "ruling theory of law" in America).
73. See John Austin, A Positivist Conception of Law (1832), reprinted in THE PROV-
INCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE
11-12 (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1954).
74. See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-62 (1897)
(discussing the problem of confusion between legal and moral ideas in contract law). See
also id. at 466-68 (discussing the need for indeterminacy and consideration of social policy
outside of the law).
75. That of H.L.A. Hart excepted. See generally H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Sepa-
ration of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
76. One might argue that this makes traditionalism outdated as a means for describing
the judicial decision making process. I agree. Following merger, traditionalism no longer
provides an accurate description of judicial reasoning. As stated above, theories based on
the conceptual muddling of law and equity more accurately describe the present workings
of the unified judicial system. But these workings are themselves problematic. As dis-
cussed below, just because traditionalism no longer "is" does not mean that its concepts no
longer "ought." See infra part III.B.
77. Stated more eloquently,
[L]aw constrains as a physical medium constrains-you can't do absolutely
anything you want with a pile of bricks ....
On the other hand, the constraint a medium imposes is relative to your
chosen project-to your choice of what you want to make.... How my argu-
ment will look in the end will depend.., on the legal materials-rules, cases,
policies, social stereotypes, historical images-but this dependence is a far
cry from the inevitable determination of the outcome in advance by the legal
materials themselves.
Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36
J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 526 (1986) (emphasis in original).
78. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma,




application places traditional realism and CLS clearly within quadrant
number one.79
This belief in the indeterminacy of legal decision making leads "realist"
scholars to reject the rule of law.80 One scholar summarized the "realist"
argument as follows: (1) all values except personal liberty are subjective;
(2) to maximize personal liberty (the only universal value), the legislature
promulgates general laws; but (3) because all values are subjective, judges
cannot neutrally interpret and apply the law. 81 This discretionary appli-
cation prevents the "law" from being prospectively knowable. Rather,
legal decision making results in a retrospective promulgation of the law
by those charged with applying it.82
But just because scholars can make the ideological distinction between
positivism and realism does not mean that this pairing works. Although
positivism and realism are ideologically distinct, they are logically incon-
sistent. How can rules guide decisions if the content of the rules is un-
knowable until after the decisions are made? Even the most adamant
proponents of merger understood this conundrum: "to say that law is
expansive, elastic, or accommodating, is as much to say that it is no law at
all."'83 Realist application destroys the positivist nature of the law.
If there is no positive law, then personal morality, in one form or an-
other, provides the only standards available for judicial decision making.
Thus, the first quadrant pairing of positivism and realism results in the
collapse of positivism into morality. As a practical matter, "Realist" the-
ory shifts from quadrant one to quadrant two, and the "law" collapses
into the traditional purview of equity.
c. Lon Fuller and Neo-Positivism
Classifying the ideology of Professor Lon Fuller presents a special chal-
lenge. His post-merger jurisprudential theories are cloaked in the lan-
guage of traditional positivism, but their application is far from
traditional. This semantic shroud requires the reader to look beyond
what Professor Fuller says to discover what it is he truly means. And
what he means attempts to place Professor Fuller's "neo-positivism"
within the moralist/formalist realm of quadrant four.
79. In this regard, CLS theory may be viewed as the most recent incarnation of tradi-
tional realism. Compare JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 42-47 (1935) (the
"law" is what courts decide in fact) with Kennedy, supra note 77, at 530-35 (as a judge, the
"law" is "How-I-Want-To-Come-Out"). For this reason, I refer to both traditional realists
and CLS theorists as "realists."
80. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 3, at 14.
81. See Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 991, 1020-21 (1994).
82. See Frank, supra note 79, at 46.
83. David D. Field, 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF




Fuller's "neo-positivism" is, in fact, neither new84 nor positivist. For
Professor Fuller, the "law" encompasses much more than merely what
the law says.85 In his opinion, the law must incorporate notions of moral-
ity: "law must represent some general direction of human effort that we
can understand and describe, and that we can approve in principle even
at the moment when it seems to us to miss its mark. ' 86 Not to play se-
mantic games of my own, but this infusion of morals into the law is "mor-
alist" thought by definition, and the notion of a "positivist/moralist" is
oxymoronic.
Although Fuller decries the formalism of traditional positivists, his
"neo-positivist" theory also strives for a formalist application. Fuller pro-
fesses that the fusion of morality and law makes legal outcomes self-de-
terminative. To be morally sound, a legal system must do justice in the
performance of its duties. To do justice, the system must be properly or-
dered. 87 Proper order requires reference to "good" morality.88 And be-
cause good morality is more coherent than evil morality, rational "neo-
positivist" judges will always find the good.89 Therefore, given a set of
facts and the proper moral "law," the just outcome is assured.
At this point, however, Professor Fuller encounters problems similar to
those plaguing the "realists" above-the distinct ideologies of moralism
and formalism do not work when paired. Fuller makes the assumption
that "good" morality will always win out over "evil," but he then fails to
define what is "good." 90 He fails in this regard because the relative na-
ture of morality makes such a definition impossible. 91 If it is impossible
to define "good" morality, then the formalist syllogism breaks down, and
judges must rely on their own conceptions of justice. Formalism collapses
into realism, quadrant four collapses into quadrant two, and the law,
again, collapses into the realm of equity.
d. Dworkinian Analysis
The jurisprudential theories of Professor Ronald Dworkin ultimately
suffer the same fate as those of Professor Fuller. Professor Dworkin is a
formalist in the sense that his theories strive to prove determinacy in the
84. Roscoe Pound, for one, believed in weighing social policies rather than applying
law amorally. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 947.
85. See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARv. L. REV. 630, 636-37 (1958) (denouncing the "law-is-law" mentality of Austin, Gray,
Holmes, and Hart).
86. Id. at 632; see also id. at 639-43 (claiming that "fundamental rules" require the
merger of law and morality).
87. See id. at 657 (discussing the problem of restoring respect for law in post-Nazi
Germany).
88. See id
89. See id. at 636 ("[Cloherence and goodness have more affinity than coherence and
evil.").
90. See id.
91. Professor Fuller tacitly recognizes this fact. See id. ("ETlhe effect will generally be




system. He is also a moralist in the sense that he views legal decision
making as requiring reference to the moralistic "principles" underlying
the law.92 In this manner, Dworkinian theory attempts to place judicial
decision making within the bounds of quadrant four.
For Professor Dworkin, one party to a dispute, even in "hard" cases, is
always entitled to judgment. 93 This entitlement is the product of existing
political rights. 94 The role of the legal decision maker is to formulate the
"best" (most correct and principled) legal argument available in defense
of these pre-existing rights.95
Unlike Professor Fuller, Professor Dworkin attempts to delineate a
process by which a legal decision maker may discover this "best" moral
theory. When the law in an area is clear, the "best" argument is the one
that most closely follows the existing legal precedent. 96 But in a complex
legal system such as ours, it is common to have cases in which the legal
rules conflict, so called "hard cases." In the face of conflicting legal rules,
the Dworkinian judge must formulate the argument that best explains
and harmonizes existing precedent, 97 gives effect to the most weighty un-
derlying principles (morals), 98 and then writes off the least possible prece-
dent as mistake.99 Upon completion of this Herculean task, the judge
applies this "best" legal argument to the facts. Application is straight
forward. If the judge's analysis was correct, he mechanically vindicates
the pre-existing right.
But despite this exceedingly well-reasoned procedure, Dworkinian
analysis falls victim to the same basic problem undercutting "neo-positiv-
ism"-it assumes that a "best" moral theory exists. To be more exact,
Professor Dworkin assumes, first, the existence of a normative "best"
morality and, second, that this normative "best" morality is empirically
significant. He assumes that in every hard case a judge can not only dis-
cover the "proper" harmonizing of precedent, weighting of morality, and
discounting of mistake, but also that enough of society would agree with
the judge's formulation to make the formulation worth while.
These assumptions are at best troubling and at worst completely bogus.
First, although the esoteric concept of a normative "best" morality is not
without merit,100 Professor Dworkin fails to provide a practical procedure
92. See Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 23 (1967)
(asserting that a principle is a standard observed because of its moral worth).
93. See generally Ronald M. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975).
94. See id. at 1058-60. Professor Dworkin terms this his "Rights Thesis."
95. See id. at 1057.
96. See id. at 1059-60 ("[Ulnoriginal judicial decisions that merely enforce the clear
terms of some plainly valid statute are always justified .... ). This would be the tradi-
tional positivist/formalist approach to law-the law is what the law says and what the law
says determines the outcome in a case.
97. See id. at 1087-93 (discussing equal treatment as the rationale underlying the bind-
ing force of precedent).
98. See id. at 1093-96.
99. See id. at 1096-1101.
100. For example, the Socratic/Platonic concept of the "forms." See generally PLATO,
THE REPUBLIC 122-212 (G.M.A. Grube trans., 1992).
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for discerning it.1°1 .Dworkinian theory lacks an overriding
"metaprinciple" for use in determining the proper relative weights of
competing principles.'1 2 Lacking ultimate guidance, a Dworkinian judge
is forced to rely on personal morality to determine these relative weights.
And because judicial outcomes rest on the balance of these weights,
Dworkinian analysis slips into the void of moral relativism.
Second, even assuming the existence of a normative "best" theory,
there is no guarantee that such theory would be empirically meaningful.
Like a line of best fit through a scattergram of random dots, the
Dworkinian theory may be the finest explanatory device available and
still be irreconcilably poor. 10 3 Nothing guarantees the social or judicial
acceptance of any theory and Professor Dworkin admits as much in his
assertion that "judges often disagree not simply about how some rule or
principle should be interpreted, but whether the rule or principle one
judge cites should be acknowledged to be a rule or principle at all.' 0 4 If
the best possible theory is, for all intents and purposes, no better than any
other theory, application of all theory becomes arbitrary.
In this way, Dworkinian formalism fails in the same sense "neo-positiv-
ist" formalism fails-morally based judicial decision making is necessarily
dynamic. In the end, Dworkinian analysis, like the other modern juris-
prudential theories of judicial decision making, collapses into moralist re-
alism. What Professor Dworkin and the others would term an exercise in
legal determination amounts to nothing more than an exercise of equita-
ble discretion.
B. IF IT WALKS LIKE A DUCK ...
Equity was not a self-sufficient system, at every point it presupposed
the existence of common law .... [If] the legislature said, "Common
Law is hereby abolished," this decree if obeyed would have meant
anarchy.
-Frederick W. Maitland 0 5
1 .... And Quacks...
I anticipate the foregoing discussion of the major modern theories of
judicial decision making will leave the reader with one question: Why
does this matter? Why does it matter if what we currently call legal deci-
sion making really amounts to no more than an exercise of equitable dis-
101. Professor Dworkin recognizes this criticism early on but then curtly dismisses it
without discussion. See Dworkin, supra note 93, at 1057.
102. See Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15 PHIL.
& PUB. AiF. 205 (1986) (discussing the CLS attack on Dworkinian theory).
103. Cf. George A. Martinez, The New Wittgensteinians and the End of Jurisprudence,
29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 545, 568-69 (1996) (discussing the problem of "bad coherence" and
criticizing the neo-Wittgensteinian school of jurisprudence for its inability to address this
problem).
104. Dworkin, supra note 93, at 1089 (discussing the importance of following the "gravi-
tational force" of established precedent).
105. Quoted in Subrin, supra note 4, at 983.
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cretion? For nearly half a millennium, equity evolved as the law's
companion system, and during that time it was always understood that an
exercise of equitable discretion could trump the positive law. Even as-
suming that your analysis is correct, how is this any different?
The problem with the current state of the jurisprudence of judicial deci-
sion making is not the embrace of discretion per se, but rather, the em-
brace of discretion couched in terms of the "law." Obviating the
distinction between the equitable and legal realms blurs the distinction
between doing what the law says and doing what the law permits. This
blurring is problematic because these two ideas are not coextensive. Uni-
versal affirmatives are only partially convertible-all that the law com-
mands, the law allows, but not all that the law allows is mandatory. This
obfuscation of direction and permission makes it impossible to know
when a judicial pronouncement is in fact endorsed or when it is merely
sanctioned.
If it is impossible to discern between these two ideas, the metaphorical
trust of traditional equity fails. So long as the will of the sovereign/settlor
remains discernible, the chancellor/judge/trustee must conform to it. A
failure to conform would provide grounds for the citizen/beneficiaries to
call for an "accounting" of the judge's stewardship. Such an "account-
ing," in whatever form, would provide an opportunity to evaluate, and if
need be, to correct the judge's performance.
But if the will of the sovereign is unknowable, it becomes impossible to
determine what the "trustee" has been directed to do. The judge is left
solely and absolutely to the dictates of conscience. 10 6 Without a definite
and certain purpose, the "trust" fails,10 7 and if the trust fails, the judge is
no longer empowered to act as the agent of the law giver. Stripped of
agency, the judge no longer commands the power to grant exception from
the blind application of the positive law. The judge no longer commands
equitable jurisdiction.
This is the great paradox of the modern theories discussed above. By
embracing discretion in the "law," these theories make the true scope of
the positive law incomprehensibly vague. The resulting vagueness evis-
cerates the very basis of the court's power to exercise discretion. By em-
bracing discretion, they forestall its legitimate use. Because they appeal
to the "law" while embracing discretion, these modern theories are no
more than jurisprudential Potemkin villages erected to mask the jurisdic-
tional poverty of the courts.
106. Judges are no longer limited to exercising discretion in the "weak" sense; they are
now free to exercise the "strong" discretion of purely autonomous decision making. Cf.
Dworkin, supra note 92, at 32-33 (discussing the difference between "weak" and "stronger"
discretion).
107. See JOHN RITCHIE ET AL., DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 521 (8th ed. 1993).
It is true that a general charitable trust will not fail for want of a specific purpose because
of the doctrine of cy pres. Id. at 740-41. But because the sovereign/settlor intended this res
to be used only for the specific purpose indicated, the doctrine of cy pres would not apply
here. Cf. Application of Syracuse University, 148 N.E.2d 671 (N.Y. 1958) (failure of a
specific charitable gift), cited in RITCHIE, supra, at 742 n.76.
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2. ... Call It a Duck
Le Roi est mort. Vive le Roi!
-Ancient French proclamation upon the death of a monarch.
Considering the foregoing, it should be easy to see why I have said the
rule of law is dead: "[a] rule is not really a rule if decision-makers feel
free to disregard it. ' ' 108 A repeal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
or a physical resegregation of the law courts and Chancery might revive
our fallen sovereign, but these remedies are both improbable and imprac-
ticable. Just as every sovereign must pass, however, every sovereign must
have its successor. In this case, the simple return to a jurisprudence em-
bracing the original ideological distinction between legal rules and equita-
ble discretion would suffice.
Recent scholarship suggests that a modem conception of the rule of
law requires only "that the public [have] reasonable notice of what the
law requires" and that the system "place real limitations on arbitrary judi-
cial decision making." 109 A system of positivist/formalist law permitting
occasional excursions into moralist/realist equity satisfies these require-
ments. Bringing the exercise of discretion back into the open would clear
the waters of judicial decision making. With the bounds of legally permis-
sible and legally mandated actions clear, the system would regain the
ability to gauge the propriety of discretionary exercises of judicial power.
A return to the rule of law under such a system would provide both
tangible and esoteric benefits to society. Consistently applied rules make
the law knowable within society,110 and known rules eliminate the need
to advert to basic principles during judicial decision making.' The judi-
cial economies resulting from formalist application of the positive law
would reduce transaction costs to the public." 2 Likewise, a knowable
law would enable citizens to plan their affairs efficiently." 3
Recognizing and permitting the exercise of equitable discretion would
mitigate the problem of over inclusiveness in the positive law. Preserving
the ability of judges to treat the differently situated differently would en-
sure fairness within the system." 4 Keeping the exercise of discretion in
the open ensures the ability to monitor discretion and to keep the exer-
cise of discretion above board.
108. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 972.
109. Segall, supra note 81, at 994.
110. See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 973.
111. See id. at 969.
112. See id. at 972.
113. That is, so as to take advantage of legal incentives and to avoid legal sanctions. See
id. at 973, 976. Compare Justice Clarence Thomas, Address Before the Federalist Society
and the Manhattan Institute (May 16, 1994), in WALL ST. J., May 26, 1994, at A14 ("If
people know that they are not going to be held accountable because of a myriad of ex-
cuses, how will our society be able to influence behavior and provide incentives to follow
the law?").




This last point is really the most important. Having "neither purse nor
sword," the judiciary depends on the voluntary compliance of those who
come before it. All that ensures compliance is a finite reservoir of respect
for our legal institutions and for the people running them. Honesty and
candor in judicial decision making are essential to maintaining this re-
spect-the trustee who is less than truthful is undeserving of the trust.115
A system, wherein judges apply only the positive law in the name of law
and wherein the exercise of judicial discretion is express and limited,
would allow a return to the rule of law. And a return to the rule of law in
some form is necessary to ensure the continued integrity and efficacy of
our system of justice.
IV. CONCLUSION
The rule of law as traditionally known is dead, but its essence survives
in the ideological distinction of law and equity. Law and equity are com-
panion systems. Standing alone, each is incomplete and unworkable, but
together they form a whole that is both determinate and flexible. In-
tended to exploit and refine this complementary nature, the merger of
law and equity instead destroyed it.
The modern jurisprudential theories of judicial decision making echo
the muddled understanding of discretion and determinacy that resulted
from merger. The espoused positivism of the modern "Realist" collapses
into moralism and the formalism of the "neo-positivists" and "Dworkini-
ans" collapses into realism because of this confusion.
This collapse into a jurisprudence of moralist realism undermines the
very rationale that initially empowered the courts to exercise discretion
and override the positive law. Because of this, the legitimacy of any exer-
cise of judicial discretion becomes questionable. To ensure the legitimacy
of the courts and respect for the judicial system, a rebirth of the rule of
law is necessary. The new rule, based on the traditional positivist/formal-
ist understanding of the law but allowing restricted excursions into moral-
ist/realist equity, would accomplish the task. Under this new rule, the
positive law would again provide the legal rules of decision, and the exer-
cise of judicial discretion would be open, express, and encouraged within
the bounds of the public trust. But until such a system arrives, the rule of
law is dead, long live the rule.
115. But see Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1307 (1995) (arguing against the conventional wisdom of requiring candor from judges).
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